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The purpose of this volume as laid out in Chapters 1 and 2 is to apply the 
capitalist lens to China's emergent political economy and thereby create 
a comparatively accurate understanding of China's international ascent. 
Chapters 3 through 5 focused on how Chinese business institutions are 
transforming China into one of the most formidable capitalist competitors 
of our era. This chapter will undertake a more expansive analysis. It will 
map the unique institutional arrangements permeating China's budding 
capitalism. The focus will rest particularly on how state and capital institu- 
tionally interact and shape China's political economy. 
The next section will briefly introduce the conceptual approach taken in 
this chapter - the capitalist institutional lens. I will then elucidate what I 
hold are the three most salient institutional contours of China's emergent 
capitalism: "network capitalism"; the rapid absorption of China into the 
"new global capitalismn; and the distinctive role of state institutions in 
China's capitalist development. In the concluding remarks I will comment 
on China's long historical trajectory and argue that contemporary state- 
capital relations possess certain parallels to those characterizing China's 
imperial political economy over the past 1,000 years. However, due to the 
contemporary international environment this historical trajectory is likely 
to be broken. 
I The capitalist institutional lens 
Over the past two decades, several conceptual lenses have been used to 
analyze China's political economy. Most of these are grounded in recent 
world historical events and are of a less general nature than the capit- 
alist lens applied in this volume. The most important interpretations are 
associated with the experiences of the East Asian "developmental state," 
the postsocialist transitions in Eastern Europe and the successor states to 
the Soviet Union, as well as pure crony capitalism. 
First, there have been numerous attempts to apply the concept of a 
capitalist developmental state, especially as practiced in Japan, South Korea. 
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and Taiwan, to China. Yet, these efforts either stretch the concept unduly or 
find that the case for China as a developmental state is not tenable (Howell 
2006). Certainly, the unitary image of a developmental state guiding the 
economy from low-value added to high-value added production processes 
hardly holds up in the face of Chinese reality. Intense rivalries among the 
Chinese state's various agencies and jurisdictional levels put considerable 
implementation constraints on central policies. In fact, overlapping and 
incongruous features often characterize theChinese stateapparatus,including 
amalgamations of regulatory, entrepreneurial, clientelist, developmental, and 
predatory state formations (Howell 2006). 
Similarly, the view of China as a postsocialist transition economy finds 
only one comparable world historical occurrence: Vietnam.' All of the 
other postsocialist transitions experienced a sequencing of political and 
economic reforms that, unlike China, at first prioritized political reforms. 
For instance, market economic reforms happened alongside the development 
of democratic politics in Eastern Europe and under the framework of 
potential integration with the European Union. Consequently, these cases 
faced political parameters highly unlike those present in the People's 
Republic of China (PRC). 
Finally, an understanding of China as primarily shaped by crony 
capitalism fails to account for the enormous vibrancy of the PRC's political 
ec~nomy.~ Crony capitalism is a system in which capitalists are in cahoots 
with state officials, using their influence over government to create an anti- 
competitive environment in which only their firms can prosper. While rent- 
seeking, corruption, and, more generally, a politicized market economy are 
hallmarks of China's reform era, there are other factors at work that make 
China's political economy much more dynamic and multifaceted than pure 
crony capitalism. 
Applying the capitalist lens to China raises the question of whether 
analytical frameworks used in the literature on comparative studies of 
capitalism, generally termed the varieties of capitalism (VoC) approach, 
can be applied. To date this literature has not incorporated a comparative 
analysis of China. As Jonas Pontusson (2005) notes, the VoC approach 
forms an important fundament on which the comparative study of capit- 
alist political economies can build, yet this literature focuses "exclusively 
on the nature and sources of variation among advanced capitalist political 
economies" (Pontusson 2005: 164). It pays less attention to how advanced 
capitalisms differ from those in the developing world. 
To effectively capture the case of China, the VoC approach would therefore 
need to move beyond existing classifications to incorporate the dynamics 
unfolding in transitional, developing, and evolving cases of capitalism. As 
Pontussen (2005: 164) succinctly observes: "The VoC literature has a great 
deal to say about 'varieties,' but surprisingly little to say about 'capitalism.'" 
Despite these shortcomings, the VoC approach can serve well to inspire an 
exploration of the institutional contours of China's capitalism. 
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Accordingly, my analysis will build on the VoC approach and, in 
particular, its use of insights contained in the "new institutionalism." This 
conceptual prism understands institutions as "building-blocks of social 
order" (Streeck and Thelen 2005: 9). Specifically, 1 employ a historical 
interpretation of institutions, while also borrowing insights from related 
schools (see Thelen 1999). I see institutions as "humanly devised constraints 
that shape human interactions" (North 1990: 3), forming "durable lock-ins 
or amalgamations of interests and social relations" (Swedberg 2005: 6). 
A historical view of institutions captures their "stickiness" or substantial 
inertia to change. Any social system is embedded in its historically formed 
political, social, and cultural background. The origins of a social system 
thus form a key influence on how it is constituted and where it is going, cre- 
ating degrees of path dependency. I must, however, stress that institutions 
are endlessly reshaped by the ideas and interests of social actors embedded 
in institutional settings. An iterative view of institutional change along 
the lines of continuously recurring feedback loops can perhaps serve our 
understanding of social change best. 
This chapter will apply a capitalist institutional lens to map the unique 
features of China's emergent political economy. As the VoC framework 
and approaches in radical political economy (see Lippit 2005) elucidate, 
capitalism evolves over time and space into distinct institutional, ideational, 
and distribution of power arrangements. Different institutional structures 
of capitalism can be distinguished across both temporal and geographical 
axes. Most works in the VoC literature, for example, include some sort of 
matrix to map institutional variations, especially among national forms of 
capitalism 
China's capitalist institutions, though, are in the process of forming and 
differ in important respects from those found in advanced capitalist systems. 
1 will therefore consciously eschew a comparative mapping of China's 
capitalist institutions. Rather, I will stress certain analytical features and 
note their historical parallels to other forms of capitalism. 
Mapping the institutional contours of China's 
emergent capitalislg 
Although in terms of speed and scale the developments unfolding in China 
are without parallel in the past, there is congruence with the processes that 
catapulted Great Britain, the United States, Germany, and Japan to inter- 
national prominence. All of these experienced the emergence of a capitalist 
political economy, manifested first and foremost by the twin processes of 
urbanization and industrialization. These processes in turn triggered the 
establishment of nation-wide infrastructures, the rapid expansion of wage 
labor, and the formation of professional classes. 
Despite these parallels, the historical, geographical and external conditions 
facing China's emergent capitalism are producing unique institutional 
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features, three of which I will outline here: first, the constitution of capital, 
particularly China's mushrooming "network capitalism"; second, the role 
of external factors, above all the influence of the "new global capitalism" 
on China's development; and finally, the Chinese state's role in initiating, 
enabling, and sustaining China's capitalist transition. 
Bottom-up: network capitalism 
Analyses of East Asia's stunning economic development have distinguished 
between two broad categories of capitalism, although considerable variations 
are found within these two categories. Asia's pioneer in capitalist development 
was undoubtedly Japan. Although Japan has undergone structural eco- 
nomic changes since the 1990s, it generated a unique form of "coordinated 
capitalism" during the heyday of its capitalist development. Central to 
coordinated capitalism is a strong state that can effectively coordinate 
investment behavior throughout the economy by forging close cooperative 
relations with private business. Ronald Dore (1997) sees Japan's form of 
coordinated capitalism as representative of an Asian model of capitalism in 
general. However, only the political economy of South Korea bears a com- 
pelling resemblance to Japan's coordinated capitalism. 
The other form of capitalism distinguished in Asia is "network capit- 
alism." It is prevalent in those regions where Overseas Chinese businesses 
dominate, including Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the Overseas Chinese com- 
munities of several Southeast Asian nations. Asia's network capitalism 
is generally associated with a generic model of Chinese capitalism and 
therefore sometimes termed "Sino-capitalism" or "guanxi capitalism" 
(Hamilton 1996; Redding 1990). 
Network capitalism is built from the ground up and does not tend to 
overly rely on legal contracts and the supervisory role of the state. Rather, it 
depends on a myriad of small-scale (often family-based) businesses. In com- 
parison to coordinated capitalism, these businesses do not tend to expand 
into large bureaucratic structures, but rather achieve wealth accumulation 
through the multiplication of small ventures (Lever-Tracy 2002). To over- 
come the disadvantages of small size, large numbers of firms coalesce into 
sizeable clusters of related businesses. 
Naturally, all forms of capitalism are to  some extent based on networks, 
but the Chinese variant is especially pronounced and quite open to new 
members. It relies on two institutions in particular: the family, especially 
in the form of family firms, and guunxi. Guanxi denotes the establishment 
of long-term informal reciprocal personal relationships. It is a form of 
social capital that acts as a binding agent among social actors. Guanxi ties 
can therefore create enduring trust which facilitates collaborations among 
firms and aids them in adjusting to changing circumstances. 
Coordinated capitalism and network capitalism have both deeply 
affected the shape of Asia's capitalist development. Japan's coordinated 
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capitalism has had important practical and ideational influences on the 
second (starting in the 1950s) and third (starting in the 1970s) wave of 
capitalist development in East Asia. Central to Japan's coordinated capit- 
alism has been the notion of a developmental state, a type of state that is 
conceived to have perfected methods of state intervention in the economy 
while heeding market forces and cooperating with private enterprise. Such 
state interventions, in turn, depended on the existence of small, inexpensive, 
but elite bureaucracies which possessed sufficient scope to take initiative and 
operate effectively. 
One of the economies heavily influenced by Japan's coordinated capitalism 
was Taiwan. Taiwan is often grouped with South Korea and Japan to 
constitute a generic model of Asian capitalism, yet its political economy 
differs from its two northern counterparts. Despite remarkable policy- 
making and implementation capacities, the Taiwanese state's influence over 
private industry has been more indirect than in Japan and South Korea 
(Gold 1986; Wade 1990). In fact, the Taiwanese state has relied for direct 
economic control on a large state sector, unusual in size and reach for a nonso- 
cialist country (Gereffi 1990). Taiwan's capitalism thus combined top-down 
planning focused on state firms with a vibrant private sector structured by 
network capitalism. 
This raises distinct parallels between Taiwan and the PRC. As on Taiwan, 
state firms and research institutes dominate most direct developmental 
interventions in China, such as in the aeronautic, automobile, and heavy 
machinery industries (Nolan 2001). And as on Taiwan, China's private 
sector was at first discriminated against or faced indifference by the agents 
of the state. This initial disregard of private sector activities by government 
triggered in both Taiwan and the PRC entrepreneurial responses based on 
family firms and guanxi networks (see McNally and Chu 2006). Jon Unger 
(2002), for instance, argues that both Taiwan and certain areas of China 
exhibit a common pattern of "Chinese" entrepreneurship based on family 
firms, informal financing, and major roles for the wives of entrepreneurs 
in managing internal operations. Even more significantly, large segments 
of the private sectors in Taiwan and the PRC have coalesced into vibrant 
business networks. 
The fact that Taiwanese family firms and partnerships have tended to 
cluster into business groups based on guunxi ties has been widely reported 
(Gates 19%; Hamilton and Biggart 1997; Shieh 1992). Similar to Taiwan, 
networks of small-scale firms have emerged in China. These networks often 
boast thousands of small businesses working in similar product markets 
and exhibiting fine divisions of labor. They rely on reciprocity and mutu- 
ality in firm relations to take advantage of economies of agglomeration. 
Some of these networks even dominate their respective product categories 
in world markets. 
However, given China's vast geographical expanse, a plethora of locally 
embedded networks has emerged. One prominent example is located in the 
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western Pearl River Delta.3 Situated along state route 105 in the jurisdiction 
of Zhongshan City are a variety of townships and villages, each of which 
specializes in one or sometimes two types of products. These "specialized 
towns and villages" (Eng 1997) include: Dachong (mahogany furniture; 
textiles); Xiaolan (metal products; home appliances); Shaxi (jeans); and 
Guzhen (lighting products). 
The origins of these specialized towns and their production clusters are 
quite varied. Some enjoy long traditions of working in certain product 
categories. These traditions either survived the Cultural Revolution or 
were reinvigorated by returning emigrants at the beginning of the reform 
era. Some clusters were initiated by foreign investors, chiefly from Hong 
Kong and Macau, while others were started by small private workshops 
at the beginning of the reform era. A final set of clusters can trace their 
origins back to one or several state or collective firms. Over time these 
firms expanded, privatized, and created collaborative relations with other 
firms, gradually giving rise to networks of firms working in related product 
categories. 
Regardless of their origins, these networks have over time created 
specialized clusters, thus locking in advantages of agglomeration. Small 
firms embedded in these networks can access market information, upgrade 
product quality and technology, and reach economies of scale that drive 
down manufacturing costs (Zeng and Williamson 2003). Although at the 
outset there was generally little government planning or initiative involved, 
in recent years many of these networks have been supported by both local 
and provincial governments. For example, the Department of Science 
and Technology under the Guangdong Provincial Government initiated in 
2002 a program aimed at creating centers for innovation and technology 
development within the confines of specialized production clusters (Bellandi 
and Di Tommaso 2005: 713-714). 
Government efforts have also focused on building industrial parks 
tailor-made for certain production processes, and exhibition centers used 
to showcase a jurisdiction's specialized products. The town of Guzhen, 
for instance, has built a gigantic Lighting Plaza that hosts an annual 
exposition called the "China (Guzhen) Lighting Fair." In fact, Guzhen has 
been officially recognized by the China Federation of Light Industry as the 
"Lighting Capital" of China. The city boasts about 3,000 registered lighting 
manufacturers employing over 50,000 workers. 
Guzhen's lighting cluster grew out of the skills of two collective enterprises. 
During the reform era, the technological expertise of these two firms was 
combined with an active commercial tradition. This led to the gradual 
emergence of perhaps the largest industrial cluster in the world dedicated 
to lighting goods. The specialization of the town is palpable when traveling 
down its 10-km long "Lamp Street," which is lined with large exhibition 
spaces displaying a dazzling array of indoor lighting systems, chandeliers, 
street lamps, outdoor LED displays, and other lighting goods. 
Guzhen and the other specialized towns in Zhongshan City have benefited 
enormously from their proximity to Hong Kong and Macau. The increased 
autonomy of local governments during the reform era allowed Overseas 
Chinese capital to either initiate or link up with emerging production 
clusters. Low-level Chinese officials driven both by their personal and 
career interests further facilitated these linkages. Over time, the influx of 
Overseas Chinese capital strengthened these localities' bargaining power 
vis-a-vis higher levels of government (Hsing 1998: 144). Alliances among 
Overseas Chinese investors, local officials, and local firms expanded, 
creating direct linkages to world markets. 
The agglomeration of large numbers of often small firms in elaborate 
production clusters is not only confined to China's eastern seaboard in 
provinces such as Guangdong and Zhejiang. It is also becoming more 
prevalent in China's landlocked interior. One example of a tightly networked 
cluster of textile firms is located in Yiyang City, Hunan Province (Guiheux 
2003). Yiyang is far removed from China's coastline and therefore proves 
that network capitalism is spreading into regions where private sector 
development is a recent phenomenon. 
As in all economies with strong ethnic Chinese influences, the reliance 
of entrepreneurs on family firms and guanxi networks contains a clear 
functional aspect. Chinese government agencies and state banks tend 
to lend little support to private firms, especially smaller firms. Private 
entrepreneurs therefore rely on family, g m x i  networks, and hybrid forms 
of clwnership to access fmance, owmme ggovernment imM&mx, compen- 
sate for institutional uncertainty, and create profit-making opportunities 
(International Financial Corporation 2000: 20-34; Wank 1999). 
The changing structure of China's political economy, though, is inducing 
Chinese local governments to increase their support for private sector 
activities (Blecher and Shue 2001; Unger and Chan 1999). Privatization 
has made enterprises independent of local governments, since private 
entrepreneurs can move across administrative boundaries to seek the best 
investment climate. At the same time, the yielding of substantial auton- 
omies to local governments opened the door to strong inte jurisdictional 
competition, with each local authority seeking to attract private enterprises 
with better investment conditions. The macro-outcome has been a rapidly 
improving investment climate for private firms and the conscious support 
by local governments of China's network capitalism, especially by establishing 
designated industrial parks. 
The highly networked structure of China's private sector is also enabling 
the emergence of a plethora of hybrid ownership forms. On one hand, the 
initial discrimination of private firms and private property rights made the 
use of guanxi networks to hook up with government officials paramount 
for creating a modicum of institutional certainty. On the other, many 
former state managers have become private entrepreneurs (sometimes while 
keeping their official positions), a situation that creates incentives to leave 
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the ownership of assets in China vague. In both cases, gucmxi networks 
have created the conditions for a variety of joint private-state ventures to 
flourish, such as when private entrepreneurs invite government officials to 
sit on their boards or act as silent investors. The hybridization of ownership 
forms in China and the emergence of network capitalism are thus closely 
linked. 
In conclusion, China exhibits a distinct prevalence of network capitalism 
in its domestic private sector. This implies that China's emergent political 
economy resembles to some extent the political economies of Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, and Southeast Asia. Perhaps the closest analogies are to the case of 
Taiwan. Capitalist development in Taiwan and the PRC is characterized by 
a certain duality. A large state sector dominates the commanding heights 
of the economy and is the direct counterpart to the central government's 
industrial policies. However, this state sector coexists, and in the case of 
China, melds with a private sector characterized by a myriad of small- and 
medium-sized firms structured by networks based on gwnxi relations. Put 
differently, while producer goods sectors, transportation, and finance are 
in the state's hands, the vibrancy of the domestic economy is being driven 
in large part by Chinese network capitalism. 
Outside-in: development under the new global capitalism 
Chapters 3 through 5 provided the reader with pertinent insights on 
aspects of China's globalization. For example, Wei Zhang et al. analyzed an 
outside-in dynamic of China's integration into the global capitalist system 
by exploring the unique melding of foreign (chiefly North American) and 
home-grown institutional arrangements in the evolution of China's venture 
capital sector. In contrast, Zeng and Williamson focused on an inside-out 
dynamic. They traced how the rapid emergence of multinationals (MNCs) 
domiciled in China is changing the global competitive landscape. 
This section will employ a wider perspective. I will trace how the timing 
of China's entry into the world capitalist system at the end of the 20th 
century is influencing the institutions of its emergent capitalism. As noted 
in the paragraphs introducing the capitalist institutional lens, capitalism as 
a socioeconomic system is not cast in stone. It evolved in world historical 
time, moving from humble beginnings to a system encompassing most of 
the globe (Braudel1982-1984; Heilbroner 1985; Wallerstein 1974-1989). 
Somewhat ironically, capitalism's earliest origins lay in an alliance of state 
and capital, namely in the form of merchant capitalism. Internationally, 
this was a highly competitive system, but nationally merchant houses 
possessed the privilege of monopoly. "The secret of making high profits 
was to secure monopolies by one means or another, exclude competitors, 
and control markets in every possible way" (Fulcher 2004: 4). 
Merchant capitalism was gradually replaced by a more market-driven 
system in the 19th century. This phase came to an end in the first half of 
the 20th century as the industrial strife and human dislocations resulting 
from the Great Depression and the Second World War triggered a reconsti- 
tution of the basic institutions of capitalism. A form of managed capitalism 
(Fulcher 2004: 41-47) transpired, which was characterized by large corpo- 
rations run by professional managers, corporatist class organizations, and 
extensive state intervention. 
The combination of low economic growth, high inflation, and greater 
global competitive pressures in the 1970s ushered in the gradual demise of 
managed capitalism. Our current era dawned, characterized by a drastic 
reduction in union power, deregulation and privatization, and the ascent of 
free-market ideology, especially in the United States and Great Britain. I 
will term this contemporary period the "new global capitalism." 
Two remarkable facets of the new global capitalism must be noted here as 
they both affect China's transition. Although globalization has been part of 
the capitalist accumulation process from its very inception, this new era of 
capitalism involves more people than ever before. The collapse of the Soviet 
bloc and the opening of India, China, Latin America, and parts of Africa to 
global trade and investment have created a truly global dynamic of capital 
accumulation. This is most succinctly expressed by the expanding reach of 
global production and innovation networks noted in Chapter 3. Equally 
significant, the high-tech boom in the United States and beyond fuelled 
a massive increase in new ventures, new knowledge, and new business 
models. The individual entrepreneur stands once again at the center of 
capital accumulation, aided by increasingly sophisticated communication 
technologies and financial mechanisms. 
The effects of the new global capitalism on the contours of China's 
emergent capitalism become clear when comparing the PRC to earlier 
developers in East Asia. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan during their 
period of rapid industrialization in the 1950s, 1%0s, and 1970s opted to 
keep foreign investment and imports tightly under control while building 
up indigenous corporate institutions to compete internationally (Amsden 
2001; Johnson 1982; Wade 1990). Only the much smaller economies of 
Singapore and Hong Kong possessed open economic environments, mainly 
due to their roles as trading and (later) financial hubs. 
The PRC entered the world capitalist system in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Chinese policy makers thus faced different pressures and opportunities than 
earlier developers in East Asia. Even though China constitutes a contin- 
ental sized economy, it is surfacing as a comparatively open system. China 
possesses a very high GDP to trade ratio and its export sector is highly inter- 
nationali~ed.~ Indeed, China has developed one of the highest "absorption 
capacities" for the forces of globalization among developing economies. 
Much of China's openness did not result from central design. For sure, 
the Chinese leadership initiated the open door policy and established 
during the early 1980s four Special Economic Zones. The aim of these 
zones was to aid political efforts to reintegrate Hong Kong, Macau, and 
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Taiwan with the PRC, and to foster limited and controllable contacts 
with the world capitalist system. They succeeded in this latter respect and 
attracted the first waves of Overseas Chinese investment with their more 
liberal environments. 
Despite these early policy initiatives, large segments of Beijing's polit- 
ical establishment continued to oppose strong internationalization during 
the 1980s and 1990s (Zweig 2002). Over time, though, these forces were 
run over by the many unintended consequences flowing from China's 
open door policy. The success of the Special Economic Zones generated 
further momentum for internationalization. Driven by cultural affinity 
and China's comparative advantage in cheap labor, Overseas Chinese 
moved beyond the zones to set up vast production networks. In particular, 
they cooperated with small-scale rural industries, which "swapped access 
to China's domestic markets in return for international capital and access 
to international markets" (Zweig 2002: 160). 
Ln this manner, Overseas Chinese capital worked wonders. It won over 
cadres who, rather than enforcing restrictive central regulations, opted to 
use their grassroots regulatory power to facilitate international exchanges. 
A domestic hunger for global linkages was unleashed that generated eco- 
nomic gains for China's local officials and, more importantly, linked 
coastal communities with the global market, paving the way for them to 
become the "workshop of the world." 
Evidently, the melding of Overseas Chinese network capital with China's 
own played a crucial role in opening China to the world. Between 1982 and 
1994, more than 70 percent of all foreign investment in China came from 
Overseas Chinese sources (Hsing 1998: 147). China's opening, though, was 
also driven by the rampant competition among Chinese local governments 
for investment capital. As with the rapid growth of China's indigenous 
network capitalism, interjurisdictional competition triggered local adjust- 
ments to the demands of investors. The central state, seeing increased 
capital flows from abroad, reacted to this situation by gradually constructing 
a more market-friendly macro-regulatory environment. 
In the 1990s these improvements began to attract the first major batch 
of MNC investments. Lured by China's potentially huge consumer market 
and its cheap and increasingly skilled labor force, these MNCs exerted 
further pressures to improve the investment climate. In 2001 these develop- 
ments took a final leap forward with China's entry into the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). 
The terms of China's WTO accession are onerous and exceed in most 
respects those of earlier developing country entrants (Lardy 2002). China's 
decision to join under these conditions reflects the leadership's eagerness 
to secure access to major export markets in the developed world.'It also 
reflects former Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji's intention to use the 
WTO agreement as a means to force reluctant domestic interest groups to 
accept greater economic liberalization (Fewsmith 2001). 
Due to its WTO accession, China is now opening significant parts of 
its domestic market to foreign investment and trade. Even more importantly, 
WTO-required reforms are prodding China to establish an investor- 
friendly institutional infrastructure. China's accession to the WTO is thus 
locking the country into "international norms" of trade (Breslin 2004). 
These changes are also aiding China's private sector by creating greater 
institutional certainty and loosening restrictions on private operators' 
scope of business. 
Both domestic and international factors have therefore interacted to 
accelerate China's participation in the world capitalist system. In hindsight, 
the increasing permeability of national barriers to world trade, the rising 
flows of capital and information, and the growing ability of manufactur- 
ers to move swiftly to regions with favorable endowments have all created 
enormous costs to any nation seeking to insulate itself from globalization. 
Due to the timing of China's capitalist transition, the new global capitalism 
opened China as much as China opened to the world. 
The process of China's opening has in large part been driven by greater 
competition for investment capital and export markets, not only within 
China, but also between China and other export-oriented economies. 
These competitive pressures are exerting a disciplining influence, since 
governments must heed the desires of international investors in order to 
attract and retain capital. The result has been the construction of a remark- 
ably liberal and internationalized export regime in China that favors 
foreign investment. 
This liberal export regime, though, sits alongside a relatively closed and 
protected domestic trading regime (Lardy 2002). The restrictions of China's 
internal trading regime apply especially to key sectors dominated by state 
firms (petrochemicals, telecoms, airlines, etc.), agricultural goods, and the 
domestic financial system. Although international competitive forces are 
increasing after WTO entry, the duality of a liberal export regime juxta- 
posed with a restrictive internal trading regime is likely to continue. The 
closed financial system, for instance, has served as an insurance against 
speculative attacks on China's currency, a situation that China's leader- 
ship is unlikely to alter until the whole financial system is on a stable and 
internationally competitive footing. 
This duality is also expressed in another institutional facet of China's 
emergent capitahm. EcoMrmic spaces that are divorced fi-om China's cbmetic 
economy but highly integrated into global production networks have been 
created in some Chinese localities. The industrial parks in Suzhou and 
Kunshan adjacent to Shanghai in Jiangsu Province are examples of how 
certain jurisdictions are adopting a "Singapore model" - they rely on MNC 
capital for domestic economic development. Industrial parks in these juris- 
dictions are segregated from the domestic economy at large and provide 
excellent hard and soft infrastructures. Separate governance systems have 
therefore been created for the sole purpose of accommodating MNC capital. 
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To conclude, China's development under the new global capitalism has 
shaped the institutions of its emergent political economy. After the initi- 
ation of the open door policy, ethnic Chinese investors built bridges linking 
China to world markets. In the process, the network capitalism of Overseas 
Chinese melded with networks of Chinese domestic producers. Gradually, 
the investment climate improved to the extent that global production 
networks incorporating MNCs made China their base for assembly operations. 
After WTO accession, China's integration into the new global capitalism 
further accelerated, starting to spawn the first generation of Chinese 
MNCs and bringing increasingly sophisticated ideas and technologies to 
China, as with the rapid growth of China's venture capital sector. 
At this point, it still is unclear how successful China will be in moving 
away from its role as a low-cost assembly site in the international division 
of labor to more value-added production processes. As Chapter 3 argues. 
MNCs and Chinese domestic corporations are already upgrading their 
operations and undertaking intensive research and development efforts. 
One thing is for sure: China's insertion into the global capitalist system is 
highly unlikely to be reversed. As in the past, external economic actors will 
continue to interact with domestic forces to shape the institutional contours 
of China's emergent capitalism. 
Top-down: the role of the Chinese state 
In Chapter 3, Dieter Ernst and Barry Naughton elucidate how the central 
state continues to control the top tier of Chinese industrial firms and thus 
the commanding heights of the Chinese economy. In addition, internation- 
ally competitive mid-tier firms are often privately run, but remain closely 
linked to state agencies or continue to be partially owned by local govern- 
ments. Unmistakably, China's industrial capitalism remains heavily shaped 
by the hand of the state. 
This is little wonder. China's reform era did not start from a clean slate 
but rather originated from a state socialist system in which the state owned 
the vast majority of productive assets. After the establishment of the 
PRC in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) undertook a gradual. 
but ultimately highly thorough process of nationalizing most industrial, 
commercial, and agricultural assets that were in private hands. This process 
reached a peak with the collectivization movement in the late 1950s, ebbed 
during the early 1%0s, and was then driven to new extremes during the 
Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). Only in the late 1970s emerged the will 
to leave the state socialist legacy behind and fundamentally restructure 
China's economy. 
Why would the CCP leadership desire to change a state socialist system 
which facilitated its political control? Internally, the chaos of the Cultural 
Revolution created a pressing need to regain legitimacy for the CCP. 
Externally, CCP rulers noticed the rapid wealth accumulation taking 
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place in Asia's capitalist developers. The realization dawned that increased 
economic wealth could translate into internal legitimacy and international 
power. A reform process gingerly exploring capitalist development began. 
The factors prodding China's reform leadership are actually not much 
unlike those prompting the leaders of other nations to explore capitalist 
development: the existence of perceived or real threats to national and/or 
regime survival (Stubbs 1999; Tilly 1975). Throughout the reform era the 
Chinese leadership perceived industrialization and technological upgrading 
as a means to buttress CCP legitimacy and China's national greatness. This 
mindset continues to the present and provides ample incentives to continue 
China's reform process. 
In essence, China's leadership jettisoned communist ideological limits 
and displayed a strong "will to develop." A dual aim of ensuring socio- 
political stability and rapid economic growth emerged, generating a unique 
melding of polices. The party retained the power of its personnel appointment 
process - the nomenklatura system - to control the career tracks of China's 
economic, political, and social leaders. Simultaneously, party leaders 
encouraged economic decentralization and experimentation to encourage 
rapid economic growth. 
The nomenklatura system constitutes the backbone of the Chinese polity. 
It functions like mucilage, the main source of systemic coherence that 
strengthens central authority by creating incentives for party members to 
adhere to central edicts. The CCP's nomenklatura system, with its counter- 
part in the government's administrative hierarchy, thus persists in guiding 
the behavior of local cadres (Edin 2003; Huang 1996). Since 1978 this 
system has evaluated CCP leaders primarily in terms of local economic 
performance, creating strong incentives for local cadres to ensure high 
paced economic growth in their jurisdictions. 
At the same time, reforms granted greater autonomy to local govern- 
ments, leading rapidly to the decentralization of economic decision-making. 
Local autonomy was reinforced by the central state's fiscal disengagement. 
Higher government levels granted fewer and fewer financial resources to 
local government units, forcing these to rely on local economic prospects 
for increased revenue flows. 
The result of combining strong incentives for maximizing economic 
growth with local autonomy was that local governments became ever bolder 
in undertaking economic experiments. Local initiatives often circumvented 
restrictive central policies. Especially along China's coastline, local 
governments engaged in feverish attempts to attract foreign capital. This 
introduced foreign knowledge, technology, and ideas to China's vanguard 
of reform. It also opened up political space for the recognition of domestic 
private entrepreneurs, giving rise to China's vibrant network capitalism 
noted above. 
The central state often tried to clamp down on local autonomies, though 
with limited success. Ebbs and flows of permitting, restricting, and again 
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permitting economic liberalization have therefore come to characterize the 
initial reform process. For example, in the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen 
Incident the central government put a halt to economic liberalization meas- 
ures, especially the sway of nascent private entrepreneurs. However, by 
1992, Deng Xiaoping's nan xun (Southern Tour) reinvigorated the reform 
process and opened up spaces for bolder reform initiatives. In the end, the 
CCP's desire to ensure regime stability and enhance China's international 
power forced it to facilitate grassroots liberalization efforts, thus enabling 
ever more expansive processes of capital accumulation. 
Overall, the Chinese state remains a central force, but its reach is not 
absolute. CCP incentives have generated a "growth-above-all-else" mentality 
among local cadres, prodding them to see restrictive central policies as 
running counter to local growth prospects. The result: local cadres often 
stifle the effective implementation of central policies and foster resource 
misuse in terms of industrial duplication and environmental degrad- 
ation. In view of this situation, we might best understand China's state as 
constituting a "diffuse developmental state" (McNally and Chu 2006). 
Due to their "growth-above-all-else" mentality, local leaders stand at the 
Forefront of establishing symbiotic interactions with private firms and 
undertaking direct developmental interventions. The central state, in 
contrast, sets the overall incentive and policy framework, although local 
autonomies tend to limit the reach of many central policies. 
The Chinese state has therefore played a crucial role in initiating, 
managing, and sustaining the process of capitalist development. However, 
it would be a stretch to conceive of it as an internally coherent actor 
along the lines of the developmental states which have characterized the 
coordinated capitalisms of Japan and South Korea. Rather, the Chinese 
state constitutes a bizarre and often contradictory system. It might display 
enormous "&velopmentalism," but institutionally it is not a homogenous 
actor that can effectively coordinate private economic activities in the 
interests of the nation. 
In other respects, though, there are some compelling resemblances 
between China and Asia's earlier capitalist developers. Like these earlier 
developers, China boasts a very high savings rate enabling high levels of 
investment in fixed assets (infrastructure, real estate, factories, etc.). 
Jonathan Anderson (UK)6: 12), for example, argues that from a macroem- 
nomic perspective the PRC ''looks almost exactly like its Asian pmiecasors." 
Growth relies heavily on f i ed  asset investment and export-oriented 
industrialization, while domestic consumption demand lags behind. 
Macroeconomic parallels are only part of the resemblance. Savings have 
to be effectively converted into investments via financial intermediaries. 
Accordingly, the states of most late capitalist developers have harnessed 
f inc ia l  institutions to intimately support the rapid development of industrial 
f m s  in cutting-edge industries (Gerschenkron 1962). This is reflected in how 
the state exerted direct influence over financial institutions in South Korea 
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and Taiwan to guide investments into higher value-added industries (Wade 
1990; Woo 1991). 
In parallel, state control over finance has allowed Chinese policy makers 
to keep interest rates low, thus unleashing waves of credit expansion. When 
these expansions get out of control, the Chinese state tends to use admin- 
istrative measures, especially the sanctions and rewards the CCP can hand 
out via its nomenklatura system, to squeeze credit growth (Huang 1996). 
The Chinese state has in this manner been able to maintain a considerable 
degree of macro-economic stability while facilitating vast investments in 
education, industry, and physical infrastructure. 
As in other state-guided financial systems, the Chinese system has its 
dark underside. This is reflected in the amassing of nonperforming loans 
and inefficiencies in the allocation of capital (Lardy 1998). Local govern- 
ment leaders, for example, can influence the branch managers of local state 
banks to finance projects for political or social reasons without regard 
to commercial profitability, a further reflection of the downsides of local 
government autonomy. 
Another cause of financial sector inefficiencies is that Chinese state 
banks extend large amounts of credit to state firms. This, though, encumbers 
economic efficiency, since the corporate governance systems of Chinese 
state firms tend to provide dysfunctional incentives to their managers 
(McNally 2002). Much of China's large stock of nonperforming loans can 
be traced back to the inefficiencies of state firms. 
The importance of state firms reflects another institutional feature that 
differentiates China's emergent capitalism from its East Asian counterparts. 
For sure, the Taiwanese and Singaporean governments have made extensive 
use of state firms for industrial policy purposes. China, though, had to 
face head-on the legacy of a state socialist system. As a result, the Chinese 
state had to consciously focus resources on the construction of market 
institutions during the reform era. This included a fundamental restruc- 
turing of the state apparatus and the building from scratch of financial 
and enterprise institutions necessary to run a successful market economy. 
Clearly, the PRC differs strongly from its East Asian predecessors in terms 
of its institutional legacy. 
An equally fundamental difference to Asia's earlier capitalist developers 
lies in size. China's landmass is vast and introduces considerable complexities 
to governance. As noted above, the central government's interests and 
viewpoints differ from those of local governments, creating substantial 
problems of policy coordination and implementation. China's large size 
also introduces starkly differing local conditions, creating an image of 
many local forms of capitalism coexisting within China. In some areas, 
local governments cooperate with private entrepreneurs in symbiotic 
relations to foster capital accumulation, while in others, local government 
officials engage in predatory behavior, creating political economies that 
contain "the worst of feudalism, capitalism, and socialism all in 
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The above was merely meant to sketch the role of the state in China's 
emergent capitalism. It is certainly not possible to reflect the totality of insti- 
tutional arrangements characterizing the Chinese state's interaction with 
economy and society. This would have to be the subject of a book-length 
exposition ." 
Nonetheless, the foregoing shows that there should be little doubt as to 
the state's contribution to China's capitalist development. There should also 
be little doubt that due to China's large size, state socialist legacy, timing 
of entry into the world capitalist system, and other factors, conceptions 
of the Chinese state must differ from those of the Asian developmental 
state. The Chinese state exhibits strong developmental impulses, but ultim- 
ately constitutes a multifaceted entity in which "a complex mix of local state 
formations, policies and economies" (Howell 2006: 292) coexist. 
Concluding remarks a historical perspective 
China is in the process of creating a unique form of capitalism, incorporating 
aspects of network capitalism, the new global capitalism, and state-led 
capitalist development. One of the central characteristics of China's 
emergent capitalism is a marked duality, reflected, for instance, in the 
coexistence of an internationalized export regime alongside a relatively 
limiting internal trading system. More fundamentally, this duality is 
manifested in the Chinese state's continued dominance over crucial aspects 
of the economy, tempered by the dynamism of China's small-scale capitalist 
producers. 
The two processes of state-led development from above and network- 
based development from below meet at the local level, where local officials 
and private economic actors have played a crucial role in initiating, 
enabling, and sustaining capitalist accumulation. As a consequence of 
this dynamic, state-capital relations have been localized and engendered 
considerable variation. Some local political economies resemble Singapore 
by their dependence on MNC capital. Others rely heavily on Overseas 
Chinese capital that melds with China's indigenous network capitalism. 
And yet others are anchored in the lasting importance of China's state 
sector. 
Perhaps the best means to comprehend the marked duality of China's 
emergent capitalism is to employ a historical perspective. In particular. 
there is a striking resemblance between China's contemporary political 
economy and the political economies of the Song to late Qing dynasties. 
Hill Gates' (1996) work elucidates this point: 
The Chinese people have lived for at least a thousand years within the 
reach of two different political-economic patterns that offered them 
different and partially contradictory possibilities and limitations. One 
is the state-managed tributary mode of production for state use, the 
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other the petty-capitalist mode, a system of commodity production by 
kin corporations. 
Gates (1996: 7) 
These two modes of production displayed a tendency to grow more 
sophisticated and complex over the course of history, although the 
duality of a state dominant mode juxtaposed with petty capitalist 
production remained intact. For instance, during the late Qing dynasty petty 
capital gradually gained in force, especially in commercial centers such as 
Hangzhou, where more completely privatized channels of production and 
commerce took hold (Rowe 1984). Moreover, as Western capitalists began 
to encroach on China, the state dominant mode resisted these develop- 
ments. Petty capitalists, in contrast, embraced new opportunities for profit, 
"often in flagrant contravention of ruling-class wishes" (Gates 19%: 8). 
The dominant imperial state thus attempted to control both capital 
and markets for its own purposes. A reliance on personalized ties to 
undertake business dealings was strongly reinforced by state officials. 
since these viewed impersonal business dealings that could lead to 
the amassing of large fortunes as a potential threat to state domin- 
ance (Gates 1996: 32). Ultimately, the driving force of Chinese history 
was "the petty-capitalist tendency toward accumulation unrelentingly 
harnessed by tributary might, turned to tributary rather than capitalist 
purposes" (Gates 1996: 8). 
In this sense, real capitalist accumulation could never progress? The 
dominant state attempted to check any challenge, setting social limits 
on the private accumulation of resources. Sizeable wealth that could 
not be effectively hidden within the realm of family and kin was often 
converted into political power (via investing in the education of offspring to 
pass examinations for public office). "The rich had to find a public role to 
safeguard private property" (Gates 1996: 38). The state dominant mode put 
political control over commercial efficiency. 
This historical legacy has left a deep imprint on China's emergent 
political economy and raises the question of whether a similar dynamic 
is playing out at present. The state's dominance over crucial industrial 
and commercial interests means that much capital accumulation remains 
driven by the state. Moreover, many private firms, despite their cumulative 
importance, remain small in scale. Only in the last five years have more 
powerful private corporations emerged in such sectors as real estate, 
electronics, foodstuffs, etc. 
China thus exhibits an emergent political economy characterized by 
two opposite forces: state-led development from above; and development 
from below that is activated by Chinese network capitalism and the forces 
of the new global capitalism. Both of these interact and drive the growing 
importance of markets in China's political economy. The result: a gradual 
strengthening of private capital and its associated social interests. 
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Nonetheless, these interests remain politically weak, reflecting how both 
China's imperial history and Leninist state structure shape its emergent 
political economy. An Chen hones in on this point in Chapter 8 and argues 
that China's capitalists are inherently state-subservient, middle and professional 
classes are just emerging, and the lowest rungs of society are politically 
powerless. Therefore, despite almost thirty years of rigorous capitalist 
development, no social force beyond the state possesses the political clout 
to challenge the CCP. State dominance remains intact, making a transition 
toward democracy quite remote. 
How long state dominance can remain intact, though, is unclear. China's 
emergent political economy creates a dynamic that pits a state-led logic 
emphasizing political control against a capitalist logic emphasizing effi- 
ciency and capital accumulation. Maryanne Kivlehan's chapter (Chapter 7) 
on the Chinese media sector captures these tensions pertinently. In her 
view, prospects for material gain will continue to drive media professionals 
to produce news that meets consumer demands, thus pushing the envelope 
of press freedom and reducing state dominance. 
Logically, a state-led logic harnessing capital accumulation for the 
purposes of CCP legitimacy must at some point exhaust itself. Certainly, 
we do not live in a static world. There are enormous competitive pressures 
emanating from the global capitalist system. Rapid capital accumula- 
tion within national borders can serve a state to repel these pressures. 
Consequently, CCP hegemony does not stand above any perceived need 
for economic expansion. Rather, the two are intricately linked. The CCP 
must ensure continued economic growth to retain its own internal political 
legitimacy while ensuring China's standing in the world. 
Competitive pressures emanating from the international system could 
therefore prompt Chinese state and party in the direction of continued eco- 
nomic liberalization, fostering increased political prominence for private 
capital. Whether this will ultimately result in the bifurcation of secular 
authority and the emergence of a "constitutional" state, as mentioned in 
Chapter 2, remains to be seen. I will come back to this problem in the con- 
cluding chapter (Chapter 12) when I attempt to highlight the most likely 
future scenarios facing China's emergent political economy. 
Notes 
1 For comparative attempts along these lines see the contributions in Nee and 
Stark (1989); and McCormick and Unger (1996). 
2 See Wedeman (2003) and He (1998) for crony capitalist interpretations of China's 
developmental dynamics. 
3 The following information on Zhongshan City's production clusters builds 
on various interviews undertaken during the summers of 2005 and 2006. See 
Footnote 5 in Chapter 2 for information on interviews conducted in China. 
4 See Chapter 9 on these points. 
5 Interview, summer 2004, Chengdu. 
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6 See, for instance, the excellent recent works on this topic by Zheng (2004) and 
Yang (2004). 
7 There has been some debate on this point, reflected by the substantial literature 
on whether indigenous commercialization and the resulting "sprouts of capitalism" 
during imperial times represented capitalism in China. For a brief overview of 
this literature see Gates (1996: 18; 38-41). 
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